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INTRODUCTION 
I fear that the diffuse and ad hominem tendencies of Bruce Green’s reply 
will distract attention from the core issues I sought to discuss. 
First, I argued that issues of professional and academic integrity and 
accountability are raised when lawyers give advice with certain third-party 
effects under conditions of partial or complete secrecy. I proposed a variety of 
soft norms, including especially a presumptive duty of publicity. 
Second, I criticized novel aggregate litigation arrangements applied by 
Leeds, Morelli & Brown (LM&B) in a series of campaigns involving many 
hundreds of clients, and I criticized the opinions of academic experts, including 
Green, who approved them. 
Although I believe the discussion of LM&B is interesting in itself as an 
account of a novel litigation structure, I intended it to amplify my discussion of 
quasi-third-party opinion practice in two ways. First, it shows the significant 
role that professional, and especially academic, experts can play in legitimating 
transactions both before and after the fact. Second, if the reader agrees with my 
argument that these opinions were egregiously “wrong” (that is, either 
 
* Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University. 
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procedurally sloppy or substantively incorrect), then they provide anecdotal 
evidence that existing norms and practices are not adequate to safeguard the 
relevant public interests. 
I am grateful for the portion of Green’s response that engages these issues, 
and I reply to it here, looking at his discussion of LM&B first, and then his 
disagreement with my proposal for more transparency. 
I. LEEDS, MORELLI & BROWN AND THE NEXTEL SETTLEMENT 
Green’s response to the substance of my critique of the experts in the 
Nextel case asserts that I failed to consider pertinent information and that I 
misstate the facts and the law. 
A. Information 
Green faults me repeatedly for failing to take account of the Colorado trial 
transcripts, and protests my failure to discuss a twenty-seven-page report he 
made and “documents relating to the negotiation of the Dispute Resolution and 
Settlement Agreement (DRSA) that would have shed light on its meaning.”1 In 
none of these instances does he say what is in the documents and how it would 
affect the merits. 
In making these arguments, Green is picking up the pieces of a collapsing 
effort by LM&B to use confidentiality as a shield from accountability for its 
treatment of its former clients in Nextel and other matters. The lawyers induced 
the clients to agree not to discuss their cases on pain of serious monetary 
sanctions. In the subsequent malpractice cases, they have asserted these 
provisions aggressively against the clients. Various gag orders have been 
entered. A notorious one in a case arising from an LM&B aggregate settlement 
with Prudential Insurance seemed to preclude the clients’ current lawyers not 
only from publicizing their claims, but from efforts to recruit professional 
assistance in preparing their cases. The clients’ current lawyer in New Jersey 
was summoned on criminal contempt charges for violating this order before it 
was reversed on appeal.2 
Since the appellate court reversal in New Jersey, other courts have refused 
some of the broad confidentiality orders LM&B has sought, but the firm 
continues to use the legal system to deter discussion of its conduct. As Green 
notes, a settlement of an Arapahoe County, Colorado class action brought 
against LM&B by several hundred Nextel claimants is sealed, and a protective 
 
1. Bruce A. Green, The Market for Bad Legal Scholarship: William H. Simon’s 
Experiment in Professional Regulation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1605, 1636 n.140 (2008); see also 
id. at 1605 n.9, 1654, 1656, 1658. 
2. Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 897 A.2d 362 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2006). The case is discussed in TED GUP, NATION OF SECRETS: THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 
AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 239-41 (2006). 
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order in the Denver McNeil case forbade discussion of its terms. The 
belligerent stance of LM&B’s defenders is well conveyed by Green’s statement 
that, by publishing my views on LM&B’s conduct in Nextel, I was “invit[ing] 
ancillary litigation over whether [I] was violating the court’s protective order” 
(even though he can cite no respect in which such litigation would have been 
justified).3 
I tried to get all the materials I could about the Nextel settlement; I 
considered all the materials I received, and I discussed all the materials I 
considered that I thought relevant. I do not have the trial transcript, or Green’s 
twenty-seven-page statement, or some discovery materials. Green and LM&B 
were at the trial and have all the documents and could, if they wanted, describe 
or disclose them. While Green does volunteer a variety of information he 
considers exonerating, his main response on the merits is to appeal to 
information he will not describe or disclose. His position seems to be that, as 
long as he or LM&B control material information, they are immune from 
criticism. Similarly, while Green asks us to give great weight to the trial 
judgment in the McNeil case, which involved two of the Nextel claimants, he 
tells us nothing about the trial other than that he testified and that I did not, and 
he reminds us that no one can discuss the class action settlement, which 
involved hundreds of the Nextel claimants. 
The broader social stakes in LM&B’s information control strategy are not, 
as Green says, the “tension between the regulatory interest in transparency and 
client confidentiality, which promotes the private and public interest in 
obtaining effective legal assistance.”4 Confidentiality is not being invoked here 
to protect clients, but to protect lawyers from accountability to clients. The 
“public and private interest in obtaining effective legal assistance” depends as 
much on assuring prospective clients that they will not be exploited by their 
lawyers as on assuring them that their secrets will be kept. LM&B’s campaign 
against transparency does serious injury to that interest. 
B. “Factual Unreliability” 
I continue to believe that my criticisms can be fairly assessed by review of 
a small number of documents that have been available to anyone who wants to 
look at them since I first circulated my draft. 
The principal focus of my critique is an opinion letter by Geoffrey Hazard 
expressly based on the DRSA and mentioning no other basis. The DRSA 
contains a clause stating that it “supersedes all prior and contemporaneous oral 
and written agreements, understandings, and representations.”5  
 
3. Green, supra note 1, at 1634.  
4. Id. at 1612.  
5. Dispute Resolution and Settlement Agreement ¶ 15(a) (Sept. 28, 2000) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter DRSA]. 
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I also criticized Green and Roy Simon for giving expert opinions in the 
McNeil litigation that referred to Hazard’s letter without noting its deficiencies, 
that reasserted most of the positions in it, and that supported LM&B’s position 
that the Nextel claimants had given informed consent to the DRSA. 
A fair prima facie assessment of all of my criticisms except those 
concerning informed consent can be made with nothing more than the DRSA 
and the original retainer agreements the DRSA replaced. The issue of informed 
consent is more complex because it turns in part on conduct of the lawyers that 
is in dispute. However, I tried to tailor my criticisms to this limitation. 
First, I faulted Hazard in his ex ante letter for failing to provide any 
guidance as to what the lawyers should do to obtain informed consent, and I 
faulted the ex post opinions of the litigation experts for failing to note the 
disadvantages of the DRSA that would have to be discussed in any disclosure 
adequate for informed consent. In addition, I offered my own example of the 
type of disclosure of the DRSA that would be required for informed consent.6 
The reader can make her own assessment of my opinion on required disclosure 
simply by examination of the DRSA. She is also entitled to draw inferences 
from the fact that Green makes no response to this argument and does not say 
what alternative disclosure, consistent with the record, would have been 
adequate. 
Second, although I do not know what oral disclosures the lawyers made, 
we do have the key document prepared for distribution to claimants, and it is 
not only materially incomplete, but affirmatively misleading in purporting to 
describe the “Highlights” of the agreement while omitting key terms about the 
amounts and conditions of payment.7 Perhaps Green is right that this record 
does not permit a definite conclusion, but it is hard to imagine what kind of 
purely oral disclosure could compensate for such deception. 
Green’s charge of factual misstatement is supported by only three 
specifics: 
First, “Simon assumes that a DRSA provision restricted the plaintiffs from 
discharging LM&B and substituting other counsel. . . . But LM&B, its clients, 
and its experts did not understand the DRSA to impose this restriction.”8 
Here is what the DRSA says: “[e]ach Claimant agrees that LM&B shall be 
his/her legal representative throughout DRP [Dispute Resolution Process] (or if 
he/she elects [an alternative process]).”9 
Here is what Exhibit A, the “Individual Agreement” intended for signature 
by the claimants, says: “[w]hile I may consult other counsel of my choosing 
 
6. William H. Simon, The Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic Professional 
Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1555, 1586-88 (2008).  
7. Highlights of Settlement Agreement With Nextel (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Highlights]. 
8. Green, supra note 1, at 1656; see also id. at 1636. 
9. DRSA, supra note 5, ¶ 7(a). 
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with respect to the Dispute Resolution and Settlement Agreement, I agree that 
LM&B shall be my legal representative throughout the Dispute Resolution 
Process.”10  
Second, “Simon assumed that the DRSA forbade the claimants from 
talking to each other about the settlement process, but ignored that this reading 
was not only disputed but contradicted by the fact that that the McNeil plaintiffs 
‘talked all the time’ with each other and with other claimants.”11  
Here is what the DRSA says: 
Claimants and LM&B understand and agree that (i) the terms of this 
Agreement, (ii) any matters related to any claim alleged by any Claimant, (iii) 
any statements made by any Party or non-party witness during DRP and (iv) 
the terms of any resolution reached between the Parties hereunder including 
pursuant to DRP . . . are confidential, and . . . shall not be disclosed to any 
person [except a mediator or arbitrator in the DRP or] a Claimant’s personal 
attorney or financial advisor, or expert retained [in connection with the DRP, 
but only if such person signs a nondisclosure agreement].12  
Claimants who breach this provision forfeit all right to relief against Nextel 
and must disgorge any relief they have received. Unlike the fee provisions, the 
confidentiality ones were fully and accurately disclosed in the “Highlights”13 
form distributed to the claimants.  
Green points to the fact that, after the DRSA went into effect, some 
claimants did discuss their cases with each other without reprisal, but this is 
irrelevant to the question of consentability and to all issues considered by 
Hazard, which turn on the parties’ understanding of the DRSA at the time it 
was negotiated. 
Third, “Simon assumes that a DRSA provision prohibited LM&B from 
accepting additional Nextel employees and former employees as clients in the 
pending dispute . . . . However, the facts were otherwise: LM&B . . . reserved 
the right to take on new claimants . . . .”14  
Green does have a small point here. I referred to LM&B’s “agreement” not 
to represent or refer other claimants against Nextel.15 In fact, while the DRSA 
provides explicitly that LM&B “will not refer” other claimants, it says only that 
LM&B “does not intend” to represent other claimants.16 Nevertheless, this 
assertion arguably involves the kind of assurance the rule against restrictions on 
practice prohibits. Moreover, Hazard, who gave the only opinion I criticized 
specifically on this issue, interpreted the assertion as tantamount to an 
agreement. He called it “the contemplated agreement whereby Leeds Morelli 
 
10. DRSA, supra note 5, Exhibit A ¶ 1 (individual agreement). 
11. Green, supra note 1, at 1636. 
12. DRSA, supra note 5, ¶ 4(a). 
13. Highlights, supra note 7,  ¶¶ 3-5. 
14. Green, supra note 1, at 1656. 
15. Simon, supra note 6, at 1594. 
16. DRSA, supra note 5, ¶¶ 1(c), 2(c). 
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will refrain from undertaking representation of other claimants outside the 
framework of the Agreement”17 and argued that it was defensible as an 
agreement.18 
C. “Legal Unreliability” 
Green’s claim of “legal unreliability” focuses on my analysis of 
consentability. Green says that “the theme of [the relevant legal authority] is 
that competent, informed clients may generally consent to be represented by a 
lawyer with a conflict of interest.”19 This cannot be a complete or useful 
summary unless all conflicts are consentable, which no one asserts. Green says 
nothing about what criteria are relevant to identifying the ones that are not 
consentable. 
Although he insists there is “ample authority,” he cites no case resembling 
Nextel. The authority he cites confirms my statement that fixed-fee 
compensation in the civil sphere “is usually found in situations involving either 
(1) routine transactions, such as uncontested divorces or consumer 
bankruptcies, or (2) situations where there is a long-term relation between 
sophisticated business clients and their lawyers.”20 None of his cases approve 
 
17. Simon, supra note 6,  app. II, at  1601 (emphasis added). 
18. Green also claims that I was mistaken in asserting that he opined that LM&B’s 
fees were reasonable in amount. Green, supra note 1, at 1650 n.194. In fact, the McNeil 
expert disclosures report Green as opining that (1) “the fee provision and the consulting 
arrangement are ethical.” Defendants Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C., Lenard Leeds, Steven 
Morelli, Jeffrey Brown, James Vagnini and Bryan Mazzola’s Expert Endorsement Pursuant 
to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(b), at 5, McNeil v. Leeds Morelli & Brown, P.C., No. 03-CV-893 
(Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver County Nov. 28, 2005); (2) “the DRSA’s terms, by themselves, are 
appropriate . . . .” Id.; and (3) “the DRSA’s fee arrangement is appropriate and ethical . . . . 
[and] inured to the benefit of [the clients].” Defendants Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C., 
Lenard Leeds, Steven Morelli, Jeffrey Brown, James Vagnini and Bryan Mazzola’s Second 
Supplemental Summary of Expert Opinions Served Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(4), at 17, 
McNeil v. Leeds Morelli & Brown, P.C., No. 03-CV-893 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver County 
Apr. 13, 2005). These statements would not be true if the fees were unreasonable in any 
respect. 
 Finally, Green complains that a prior draft of my article erroneously attributed to him 
the view that “it was sufficient disclosure simply to permit the claimants to examine a copy 
of the . . . DRSA.” Green, supra note 1, at 1650 n.193. The basis for this attribution was the 
following sentence from the expert disclosures: “Professor Green will opine that the fact that 
Plaintiffs personally received a copy of the DRSA that they were able to review before they 
attended their mediations, depositions, prepared for arbitrations, and before they executed 
their general releases, amounts to full disclosure.” Defendants Leeds, Morelli & Brown, 
P.C., Lenard Leeds, Steven Morelli, Jeffrey Brown, James Vagnini, and Bryan Mazzola's 
Supplemental Summary of Expert Opinions Served Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a) (4), at 17, 
No. 03-CV-893 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver County Apr. 13, 2005). 
19. Green, supra note 1, at 1663. 
20. Simon, supra note 6, at 1588 n.137. In the insurance defense cases, the long-term 
relation is with the insurance company, which is usually not considered a co-client of the 
insured. However, since the interests of the company and the insured are aligned across a 
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fixed fees for plaintiffs’ lawyers in tort cases, much less fixed fees to be paid by 
the clients’ adversary prior to negotiation of relief for the clients. The only 
relevant proposition his citations establish is that fixed-fee arrangements are not 
per se non-consentable, a proposition I never disputed. 
My argument did not rest on categorical generalities of the sort Green 
wrestles with. It rested on a contextual inquiry involving eight factors of which 
Green discusses only one. In particular, Green evades the critical question of 
what benefits a Nextel claimant could reasonably have expected from the shift 
from contingent to fixed compensation that would have justified accepting the 
worse incentives the shift entailed. 
Green’s criticism that “Simon never explains . . . why [we should assume 
that there were better available alternatives to the DRSA] and has no factual 
basis for this assumption”21 involves a misunderstanding of the conflicts rule. 
Under Model Rule 1.7, once we have a conflict, the proposed representation 
can proceed only when there is a reasonable basis for concluding that it will 
“not be adversely affected.”22 To the extent that uncertainty precludes such a 
conclusion, the rule prohibits the representation. The conflicted lawyer thus 
bears the burden to provide reasons for believing there are no better 
alternatives.23 Of course, the burden is only to provide a reasonable basis, not a 
conclusive determination. But the lawyer who seeks to justify a highly unusual 
and intensely conflicted arrangement like the DRSA on the basis of the 
unavailability of other alternatives must do more than appeal to speculative 
possibility. It would have been incumbent on LM&B to provide some reasons 
for believing that more conventional and less conflicted alternatives were not 
available, and Green does not suggest that it did so or could have done so. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE EXPERT WITNESS 
My argument applied to nonacademic as well as academic experts and to 
experts both outside and inside litigation, but in the interests of concision, I will 
focus on the role of academic lawyers as litigation experts.24 
 
fairly broad range, the company’s monitoring affords substantial protection to the insured. 
Even here, however, as Green acknowledges, authority is divided. See Green, supra note 1, 
at 1665 n.265.  
21. See Green, supra note 1, at 1668 n.273. 
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1996). I quote the pre-2002 
language. The current version requires a reasonable finding that the representation of each 
client will be “competent and diligent.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2002). 
23. See Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d 89, 92 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (disqualifying on 
conflicts grounds a legal aid organization from representation of an indigent client after 
concluding the lawyer had failed to show that less conflicted alternatives were not available); 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (2002) (defining “informed consent” to require 
explanation of “reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct”). 
24. Some of Green’s arguments are aimed at targets of his own creation. My 
suggestion of a duty to “update” statements that are known to have become misleading 
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The differences between Green and me arise from a collision between the 
normal academic practice of public discussion and peer review and a litigation 
culture preoccupied with secrecy and personal credibility. The practice of 
making one’s professional views available to public scrutiny, which is a basic 
normative foundation of the academy, is subversive of the established practices 
of the high-stakes litigation bar. These practices, however, are more the product 
of a tacit and insular subculture than of legal principle. For the most part, they 
are not supported by judicial authority, and it is possible that they are 
dysfunctional from the point of view, not only of the academy, but of the 
broader goals of the legal system. 
Here I respond, first, to Green’s argument that experts who intend to open 
their opinions to public scrutiny should be disqualified from testifying, and 
second, to his argument that established litigation norms are sufficient to 
safeguard the reliability of expert witness opinion-giving without academic-
style transparency. 
A. Publicity and Credibility 
On the authority of a motion by LM&B’s defense counsel that was never 
ruled on, Green argues that experts who intend to make their litigation opinions 
publicly accessible should not be permitted to testify. The reason is that 
publicity creates pressure to shade one’s views in ways likely to win 
professional glory. Green also appears to endorse the defense lawyers’ 
contention that, since academic glory is most readily achieved by harsh 
criticism of colleagues, publicity biases an academic expert in favor of strong 
criticism of opposing experts.25 As a long-shot litigator’s tactic, the argument 
reflects a certain desperate ingenuity, but it is frivolous.  
Expert witnesses are virtually never disqualified on the grounds of bias.26 
According to the doctrine, bias goes to credibility, not to admissibility. How 
does the doctrine suggest publication bears on credibility? I cannot find any 
cases discussing the relevance of an expert’s contemporaneous or intended 
 
becomes in his hands a duty to revise whenever “new facts” come to one's attention. See 
Green, supra note 1, at 1638; Simon, supra note 6, at 1565-67. Green has me proposing an 
exceptionally demanding duty of “due diligence” for litigation experts, when I suggested that 
such duties should be relaxed for litigation experts. Green, supra note 1, at 1636-38; Simon, 
supra note 6, at 1566 n.36. 
25. Green, supra note 1, at 1633, 1642-44. After I wrote this response, Green added a 
footnote to his article asserting that he was not taking a position on the merits of the 
defendants’ motion to exclude my testimony.  Green, supra note 1, at 1644 n.175.  His 
argument now appears to be that I acted irresponsibly in provoking the defendants’ motion 
even if it was meritless.  This is like telling the victim of a neighborhood bully that he was 
“asking for it” by exercising his right to walk down the street. 
26. See, e.g., In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 173 F.3d 145, 166 n.11 (3d Cir. 
1996) (stating that “expert witnesses cannot be excluded on the basis of bias”); 4 JACK B. 
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.04[5] n.38 
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
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future publication, but there are dozens of cases referring to past publication, 
and they invariably refer to publication as bearing favorably on credibility.27 
A plausible comparison for the kind of bias Green attributes to me is his 
own bias as a frequent paid expert witness.28 Obviously, Green has an 
economic incentive to satisfy his client in this case and to maintain a reputation 
as an expert who reliably delivers helpful testimony. No one suggests that this 
bias disqualifies Green, nor denies that he has other motivations that might 
neutralize it. But even assuming, as Green alleges, that I damaged my 
credibility as an expert by writing about the case, surely Green did more 
damage to his credibility by charging a large fee for his testimony. (I declined 
to take a fee for my work in the case and rarely consult for pay.29) It was 
perfectly legitimate for Green to charge for his opinions, but that fact shows 
that experts may have valid reason for doing things that impair their 
effectiveness. 
The academic bias is in fact less distortive than the economic one. The 
reason is not that the quest for peer esteem is less powerful than the desire for 
wealth. The reason is that the selfish desire for glory is much more convergent 
in the expert witness situation with public interests than the desire for wealth. 
The academic’s best strategy for attaining professional glory is to take positions 
on important issues that are convincing to the relevant professional community. 
I do not ignore the fact that the academy sometimes rewards charlatanism and 
vulgarity, but for most of us, they are less promising even as purely selfish 
strategies than well-grounded analysis.  
Green’s argument becomes positively bizarre when he asserts that I 
violated the rule prohibiting a lawyer from negotiating “media rights” with 
respect to a “representation” before its conclusion.30 The rationale for the rule 
is that such rights might tempt the lawyer to conduct the representation in ways 
that enhance the value of the media rights to the detriment of the client (for 
example, by discouraging a plea bargain that would obviate a high-profile 
trial).31 
The rule, however, applies to lawyers in an attorney-client relation with the 
subjects of the media rights, not to expert witnesses.32 I had no power to shape 
 
27. A key source of this theme is Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 
U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (“[S]ubmission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a 
component of ‘good science,’ in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive 
flaws in methodology will be detected.”). For the more general proposition that on balance 
publicity enhances responsibility, see Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884) 
(Holmes, J.) (“[T]rial[s] . . .  should take place under the public eye . . . because . . . those 
who administer justice should always act under the sense of public responsibility . . . .”). 
28. Green billed at least $46,000 for his work in the McNeil case. He had testified 
seventeen times in the four years that preceded his expert disclosure in that case. 
29. Prior to McNeil, I had testified twice in my twenty-seven-year academic career. 
30. Green, supra note 1, at 1634. 
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.8 cmt. ¶ 9 (2004). 
32. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-407 (1997) 
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any part of the case other than my own testimony. Outside the attorney-client 
relation, “media rights” are rights to commercially exploit personal 
information.33 I was not using any information commercially, and all the 
information I used was in the public domain.34 
Although there is no dispute that an expert should have a clear 
understanding with the client about publication and confidentiality, Green’s 
characterization of my arrangement with the McNeil plaintiffs as “secur[ing] 
plaintiffs’ waiver of confidentiality” or testifying “in exchange for” the right to 
discuss the case publicly is tendentious.35 I viewed myself not as bargaining for 
some special right, but as retaining the right I always had to discuss my 
opinions on matters of public interest. 
This brings me to a final point about publicity. The key issue between 
Green and me is not about whether expert witness views should be publicized. 
Nextel went public with Hazard’s endorsement as soon as its conduct was 
questioned.36 Kaye Scholer went public with Hazard’s exoneration.37 No doubt 
Hazard would have been a witness in both cases had these clients gone to trial. 
The Nextel claimants first came to me in the course of trying to publicize their 
claims; they asked me to talk to ABC News. In doing so, they were simply 
following the example of LM&B, which launched its campaign against Nextel 
with a publicity barrage.38 (Does Green think that, in doing so, the firm 
violated the “media rights” rule?) What Green really objects to seems to be, not 
that my views were made public, but that I did not surrender to the clients my 
independence to decide when and how to do so. Yet, surely independence is 
precisely what is supposed to distinguish the expert from the advocate. 
 
(stating that lawyer serving as expert witness for a party “does not thereby establish a client-
lawyer relationship with the party”).  
 Green’s assertion that I have had an attorney-client or advocacy relation with some 
claimants against LM&B is false. Green, supra note 1, at 1652-53. I have given my views to 
lawyers representing claimants but have not helped them develop positions or opinions with 
which I disagree.  I have never accepted a duty of loyalty to any Nextel claimant, and in the 
McNeil deposition, I disclosed my communications with plaintiffs’ counsel without 
reservation. 
33. See 3 & 4 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 17-20 (3d ed. 2005). 
Even within the attorney-client relation, the “media rights” rule may apply only to 
agreements for commercial exploitation. See 1 RESTATEMENT  (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 36 cmt. d (2000) (interpreting the “media rights” rule as applying to 
“contracts in which the lawyer acquires the right to sell or share in future profits from 
descriptions of events covered by the representation”). 
34. See In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 104 F.R.D. 559, 567 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that discovery materials are presumptively “open to the public”). 
35. Green, supra note 1, at 1607, 1644. 
36. See Story by Sarah Wallace (ABC television broadcast Nov. 4, 2003) (on file with 
author). 
37. Susan Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, AM. LAW., May 
1992, at 68. 
38. Seth Schiesel, Workers Plan Bias Lawsuits Against Nextel, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
2000, at C1 (reporting on an interview with an LM&B lawyer about Nextel claims). 
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B. Litigation Process and Accountability 
Green argues that the kind of diffuse public accountability I call for is 
unnecessary because the litigation process generates sufficient pressures that 
hold experts accountable. Experts are subject to discovery before trial and 
cross-examination at trial. Their testimony will be assessed at trial in critical 
comparison with that of opposing experts. Green thinks that, as a general 
matter, such processes are adequate to ensure reliability, and as a specific 
matter, that they warrant giving strong or conclusive weight to the Denver trial 
court's decision in favor of LM&B.39 
However, the legal process and the sphere of public and academic debate 
function in different ways. Although their purposes overlap, they are not co-
extensive. As a mechanism of public accountability, litigation is not a plausible 
substitute for public review and criticism. At best, it is a complement. The 
courts are better able to impose practical solutions to specific problems when 
they are needed and to deal with people who act in bad faith. However, they are 
less well equipped to settle matters of principle, and their processes often 
induce bad faith. 
This is not the place for a full-scale consideration of the matter, but I can 
suggest some basic differences between litigation practices on the one hand and 
the more informal processes of civil society debate on the other that indicate 
why, without the kind of transparency I recommend, the former are unlikely to 
afford sufficient safeguards of professional accountability. 
Finality. The courts deal with claims for coercive state intervention, and 
there is a social interest in limiting the pendancy of such claims. Thus, the 
courts declare their decisions final at some point. But to the extent cases 
involve matters of public principle, such declarations are often arbitrary and 
they do not bind public discussion. Anyone who finds the Nextel issues 
interesting has no more reason to regard the Denver trial verdict as conclusive 
than she does to refuse to consider whether the Triangle Shirtwaist Company 
was negligent because it was exonerated by a jury. (The McNeil trial verdict 
says little about the issues even as a matter of civil procedure. If and when it 
becomes final, it will be binding on only two of the nearly six-hundred Nextel 
claimants. Most of them participated in the settlement of another case, and 
some are involved in a pending one.) 
Incomplete alignment of process and substance. Most cases are settled 
rather than tried, and many are settled without significant discovery. In such 
cases, experts can give opinions that have influence without being subjected to 
extensive challenge or scrutiny. Some prominent experts charge large retainers 
on the premise that the mere announcement that they are testifying will give 
 
39. In view of the importance he attaches to the deposition as a mechanism of expert 
accountability, Green, supra note 1, at 1622, 1640, 1648, it is worth noting that Green's 
deposition was never taken in the McNeil case. 
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their client a settlement advantage. In many cases, the parties have highly 
unequal resources. (That was strikingly true of McNeil, which pitted a sole 
practitioner working on contingency against three law firms well funded by 
insurance money.) And the skill of an advocate or a witness can often make 
more difference than the underlying merits. (Lawyers like to think both that the 
litigation process routinely generates correct results and that an exceptionally 
good lawyer can dramatically increase a client’s chance of winning. But to the 
extent that the second proposition is true, the first cannot be.) 
Compression and credibility. The public phase of the trial process is 
strongly and artificially compressed. The parties prepare more or less in secret 
for a long period and they must execute a highly orchestrated performance in a 
very short time. The performance places very high demands on the 
concentration and memory of the trier, especially when it is a jury. 
For this reason, litigators strive for simplification and dramatization. The 
trial has a tendency to evolve toward a war of sound bites—small dramatic 
dialogue moments—that the lawyers hope to assemble into a coherent picture 
in closing argument. With expert witnesses, these tendencies lead to an 
emphasis on credibility over substance. It is easy to show on cross-examination 
that an expert made a prior inconsistent statement or a minor factual mistake or 
that her brother-in-law works for the party she is testifying for. It often takes 
much more skill and time to show that she made an error of logic, failed to 
gather adequate data, or misapplied an analytical method. Thus, the discovery 
process is often more preoccupied with a search for prior inconsistent 
statements or embarrassing background facts about the expert than for the 
factors that a peer would consider most important to assessing her credibility. 
Adversarial information control. As Green emphasizes, conventional 
litigation practices require the expert to give her client control over the people 
she talks to about the case. Usually, this means that she will refrain from 
discussing her ideas with disinterested colleagues and will talk only to people 
with a single partisan view of the case. In the academic world, on the other 
hand, engagement with people of different views is considered essential to 
sound understanding. The divergence between litigation and academic norms is 
illustrated by Green’s portrayal of my sending him a draft of my article, a 
routine requirement of academic fairness, as a sinister act.40  
Publicity. The attitude of the court system to transparency is more complex 
and qualified than that of the academy. As between the parties, the court system 
gives each the right to demand any material information from the other that she 
 
40. See Green, supra note 1, at 1643. The value of this practice does not depend, as 
Green suggests, on whether the sender is acting from “collegial” or strategic motives. If 
Green had responded with material information or compelling arguments, I would have been 
obliged to take account of his response even if it changed or weakened my position. The 
inference from Green’s silence that I drew was rational and revealing. The most important 
function of the practice of sending drafts to people we criticize lies in its tendency to 
engender more reliable understanding, not in the subjective dispositions it expresses. 
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can describe with reasonable particularity, and this right is more readily 
enforceable against a person in bad faith than academic norms, which rely 
mostly on soft sanctions. On the other hand, there is usually no duty in 
litigation to volunteer information that is not requested, and lawyers sometimes 
have an ethical duty to withhold material information. With respect to public 
disclosure, the court system pays lip service to values of public access, but it 
compromises these values in two ways. First, it (too) readily allows parties to 
seal records or obtain gag orders. Second, even to the extent information is 
public in principle, the courts often do not make it practically accessible.41 
Privacy. Confidentiality, in essence, is the private right to control 
information even when it is material to resolution of a public controversy. 
Privacy is the right to withhold information that is both personal and not 
material to public issues. In the academic world, confidentiality is weak, but 
privacy is strong. Scholars are generally honor-bound to disclose material 
information but, aside from a few basic concerns like financial relationships, 
are not subject to compulsory disclosure of private information. 
By contrast, in the litigation culture, confidentiality is strong, but privacy is 
weak. Because the culture is preoccupied with motivation and bad faith, 
witnesses are subject to broad interrogation on personal background 
information. Expert witnesses, for example, are routinely asked to disclose all 
the conversations they have had with anyone about the substance of their 
testimony. Such discovery includes both tentative statements that are later 
discarded, and the kind of casual personal remarks that are routinely made in 
private conversation but look embarrassing when made public. The absence of 
privacy in the litigation sphere has some perverse effects. It causes some 
experts to refuse to participate. It reinforces the tendency I have already 
mentioned to avoid discussion with peers or committing tentative thoughts to 
paper. And it seems to encourage an artificial projection of confidence in court. 
Reputation. An academic who takes a position publicly on some issue in 
her field puts her reputation at risk. Reputations are constructed diffusely and 
incrementally. There is a good deal of “noise” in the process, but most 
academics believe that there is a correlation between good practice and good 
reputation, and that, overall, reputation creates incentives for disinterestedness 
and intellectual rigor. 
Reputational forces cannot operate strongly in the litigation area. Under 
current practice, the positions an academic takes as a witness are rarely subject 
to scrutiny in her own field. These opinions are addressed to a judge or jury, 
but the judge rarely sees the expert more than once and the jury never does. The 
 
41. Green repeats Paul Gordon's assertion that “the Denver District Court public 
record . . . speaks for itself” as to whether Gordon or I was responsible for any delays in the 
disclosure of my anticipated testimony. Green, supra note 1, at 143 n.186. Yet, Green knows 
that hardly any readers outside of Colorado will have access to the record. (Although I have 
only limited access myself, I know of nothing that indicates I was responsible, and 
something tells me that, if Green did, he would not have hesitated to report it.) 
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only repeat players in the litigation process who are in a position to keep track 
of expert reputations are the litigators. Even they have only incomplete 
information about the expert’s prior litigation opinions, but they are in a 
position to take account of the information they have in deciding whom to 
engage. However, their incentives are quite different from those of academic 
peers. They value experts in terms of how helpful their testimony is to their 
clients’ claims. The most desirable quality for them is a combination of discreet 
partisanship and strategic cleverness. Thus, reputational forces in the litigation 
realm do not encourage disinterestedness or professional rigor in the way they 
do in the world of public discourse. 
CONCLUSION 
Green’s Article exceeds the combined length of my original Article and 
this Reply. In all that space, he is unable to point to a single material error or 
omission in my account of the Nextel record (and only one nonmaterial one). 
The evidence needed to assess my criticisms is fully available to any reader 
willing to make the effort. 
Much of Green’s article is devoted to accusations of impropriety on my 
part that have no bearing on the issues I raised. Some of this discussion 
illustrates that preoccupation with credibility and bias is, in words of mine that 
Green quotes, “paralyzing and trivializing.”42 Some of it is more ugly than 
tedious. Green is oblivious to the distinction between a critique of publicly 
expressed opinions based on an incomplete record and an accusation of private 
misconduct based on no evidence at all. The former, exemplified by my 
critique of Green’s Nextel opinions, is legitimate and necessary in a world of 
scarce information. The latter, exemplified by Green’s speculation that I did not 
get adequate consent from the McNeil plaintiffs, is McCarthyism. It is true that 
“there is no indication that the plaintiffs understood” my intentions43 only in 
the sense that it is true that “there is no indication” that Green is not embezzling 
from Fordham Law School or assisting Al Qaeda. 
Green is correct that the norms of the litigation culture differ from those of 
the academic one. It is arguable (though doubtful to me) that that the former are 
optimal for dispute resolution purposes. However, they are inimical to effective 
public resolution of controversies. To that extent, Green’s confidence in the 
capacity of conventional litigation practices to neutralize the perverse pressures 
of the market for bad legal advice seems misplaced. 
 
42. Id. at 1646 n.181. 
43. Id. at 1633. 
